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INTRODUCTION 
According to the Washington Post, between 2010 and 2012, 
unmanned aerial vehicles (“UAVs”), commonly known as “drones,” were 
deployed nearly 700 times by U.S. Customs and Border Protection on 
behalf of local and state law enforcement agencies.1 In 2015, the Federal 
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 1. Craig Whitlock & Craig Timber, Border Patrol Drones Being Borrowed 
by Other Agencies More Often Than Previously Known, WASH. POST (Jan. 14, 
2014), http://www.governing.com/news/headlines/Police-Agencies-Using-Border-
Patrols-Drones-More-Often-Than-Thought.html [https://perma.cc/KNW8-HEAG]. 
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Aviation Administration (“FAA”) began accepting applications for drone 
licenses by law enforcement agencies.2 Given the number of different ways 
drones can now aid departments in gathering intelligence, the number of 
applications will likely only increase. Drones can be equipped with facial 
recognition software,3 heat sensors, and other high-tech features, such as 
microphones capable of detecting gunshots and even personal 
conversations.4 Some military grade drones are equipped with “Wi-Fi 
crackers” and bogus cell phone towers that allow law enforcement to 
pinpoint a suspect’s location while simultaneously intercepting text 
messages and phone calls.5 Some of these drones can remain airborne for 
hours, even days. Tiny drones, also known as “insect drones” or “micro-
drones,” are currently in development and are said to be capable of going 
completely undetected.6 
Although drones can be used for a wide range of positive and 
beneficial objectives—for example, crop and land surveys, power line and 
pipeline inspections, forest fire detection, and search-and-rescue 
missions7—some agencies have used drones in ways that raise serious 
privacy concerns. For example, in 2011, the Los Angeles Times reported 
that police in Grand Forks, North Dakota had used a Predator B Drone—
                                                                                                             
 2. Ben Wolfgang, FAA Chief Says Drones Will Force Change at Agency, 
WASH. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2012), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/aug/7 
/faa-chief-says-drones-will-force-change-at-agency/ [https://perma.cc/WM3B-RP 
BK]. 
 3. Amanda Ziadeh, Drones Get Sightline Tracking, Facial Recognition Tech, 
GCN (Nov. 7, 2016), https://gcn.com/articles/2016/11/07/drone-partnership.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/Q9F5-EEJP]. 
 4. Tina Moore, NYPD Considering Using Drones and Gunshot Detectors to 
Fight Crime, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (May 20, 2014, 11:45 PM), http://www.nydaily 
news.com/new-york/nyc-crime/nypd-drones-fight-crime-article-1.1799980 [https: 
//perma.cc/VQ62-AAXS]. 
 5. Andy Greenberg, Flying Drone Can Crack Wi-Fi Networks, Snoop on Cell 
Phones, FORBES (July 28, 2011), http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2011 
/07/28/flying-drone-can-crack-wifi-networks-snoop-on-cell-phones/#55284a2f66f9 
[https://perma.cc/8SGL-QLJ7]. 
 6. Adam Piore, Rise of the Insect Drones, POPULAR SCI. (Jan. 29, 2014), 
http://www.popsci.com/article/technology/rise-insect-drones [https://perma.cc/T3CJ-
VTZG]. Insect drones were recently depicted in the 2015 movie, Eye in the Sky. EYE 
IN THE SKY (Entertainment One & Raindog Films 2015). 
 7. Some agencies have used drones for the very purpose of search and rescue. 
Dee J. Hall, Fitchburg Man Found Alive, WIS. ST. J. (Jul. 19, 2014), http://host.madi 
son.com/wsj/news/local/crime_and_courts/fitchburg-man-found-alive-unharmed-af 
ter-nearly-three-days-outside/article_f6274133-90b6-5282-98d8-1304bb6d1f8d.html 
[https://perma.cc/DU43-KGNE]. 
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equipped with “heat sensors and [a] sophisticated radar”—to help locate 
three individuals suspected of cattle rustling.8 The drone was fitted with a 
live-feed camera, enabling law enforcement officials to pinpoint the 
suspects’ exact location.9 In 2009, the Texas Department of Public Safety 
launched a bird-sized drone called a “Wasp” over a suspect’s house while 
waiting to execute a search warrant.10 The drone offered law enforcement 
officials an aerial view of the property before they raided the residence. 
In light of increased drone use, there has been a bipartisan effort in 
Louisiana to pass legislation regulating drones.11 These measures are 
important, and lawmakers are correct in their attempts to clarify what 
citizens can and cannot do with these machines. In 2016, Governor 
Edwards signed into law two bills restricting drone use.12 The first restricts 
drone use near schools, school property, or correctional facilities.13 It 
includes exceptions for police and for situations in which the landowner 
grants permission.14 The second subjects drone usage to criminal 
trespassing laws.15 Notably, however, neither of these bills regulate the use 
of drones by police. 
Although the use of drones will undoubtedly provide law enforcement 
agencies with new means of gathering intelligence, these unmanned 
aircrafts bring with them a host of legal and epistemic complications. This 
Article examines the domestic use of drones by law enforcement to gather 
                                                                                                             
 8. Brian Bennet, Police Employ Predator Drone Spy Planes on Home Front, 
L.A. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/dec/10/nation/la-na-
drone-arrest-20111211 [https://perma.cc/CV4L-R5ET]. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Peter Fin, Domestic Use of Aerial Drones by Law Enforcement Likely to 
Prompt Privacy Debate, WASH. POST (Jan. 23, 2011, 12:56 AM), http://www.wash 
ingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/22/AR2011012204111.html?sid=S 
T2011012204147 [https://perma.cc/AJ3G-N95K]. 
 11. Louisiana Lawmakers Want to Get Drones Under Control, TIMES-PICAYUNE 
(April 26, 2016, 9:46 AM), http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2016/04/louisiana 
_lawmakers_want_to_ge.html [https://perma.cc/VP4G-CFAB]. 
 12. Edwards Agrees to New Restrictions on Drones in Louisiana, WDSU 
NEWS (June 22, 2016, 8:59 AM), http://www.wdsu.com/article/edwards-agrees-
to-new-restrictions-on-drones-in-louisiana/3608454 [https://perma.cc/3UVA-R7 
U9]. 
 13. H.B. 19, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2016) (codified at LA. REV. STAT. §§ 
14:337(A), (D), (E), 14:377(B)(3)(d)) http://www.legis.la.gov/legis/ViewDocument 
.aspx?d=1012765 [https://perma.cc/6J7R-BV88].  
 14. Id. 
 15. S.B. 141, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2016) (passed and signed into law 2016), 
http://www.legis.la.gov/legis/ViewDocument.aspx?d=1012711 [https://perma.cc/QD 
Z4-EJWZ].  
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information. First, Part I considers the Fourth Amendment and the 
different legal standards of proof that might apply to law enforcement 
drone use. Part II then explores philosopher Wittgenstein’s notion of 
actional certainty. Part III discusses how the theory of actional certainty 
can apply to the Supreme Court and its epistemic challenge of determining 
what is a “reasonable” expectation of privacy. This Part also investigates 
the Mosaic Theory as a possible reading of the Fourth Amendment. 
I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: SEARCHES AND PRIVACY 
“The purpose of the probable-cause requirement of the Fourth 
Amendment [is] to keep the state out of constitutionally protected areas 
until it has reason to believe that a specific crime has been or is being 
committed.”16 A search passes constitutional muster, then, if law 
enforcement has probable cause to think a crime has or is occurring17 or if 
the search does not constitute an unreasonable intrusion into a 
constitutionally protected area18 or does not violate a person’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy.19 In light of this constitutional framework, this 
Section first discusses the standard of probable cause as applied to law 
enforcement use of drone surveillance and then whether drone surveillance 
violates a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy. 
A. Reasonable Searches and Probable Cause 
The Fourth Amendment has two clauses. First, citizens are protected 
against unreasonable searches.20 Second, warrants may be issued only 
when they describe with particularity the place to be searched and the 
persons or things to be seized.21 In U.S. v. Leon, the U.S. Supreme Court 
noted that “[a] Fourth Amendment case may present two separate 
questions: whether the search was conducted pursuant to a warrant issued 
in accordance with the second Clause, and, if not, whether it was 
nevertheless ‘reasonable’ within the meaning of the first.”22 If a 
governmental search is found to have violated the Fourth Amendment, the 
fruits of the search are not admissible as evidence in court because such 
                                                                                                             
 16. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 59 (1967). 
 17. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 & n.23 (1968). 
 18. See generally Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
 19. See generally Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 20. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 21. Id.  
 22. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 961 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part). 
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evidence is considered “fruit of the poisonous tree.”23 Thus, the Fourth 
Amendment—at least in theory—should act as a significant limit on police 
power.24 All of the rights contained in the Fourth Amendment have been 
selectively incorporated so as to apply to the states.25 
Many searches performed by law enforcement are done without a 
warrant and without violating Fourth Amendment protections. By only 
prohibiting “unreasonable” searches and seizures, the language of the 
Fourth Amendment indicates that “reasonable” searches and seizures by 
law enforcement are constitutional.26 A search is deemed reasonable when 
the police can prove first, that it is more likely than not that a crime has 
occurred,27 and second, if a search is conducted, it is probable the police 
will find either stolen goods or evidence of the crime.28 These two 
requirements constitute probable cause to perform a search. Probable 
cause can be established to obtain a warrant before a search or can be used 
to justify the reasonableness of a search after the fact.29 
Judicial decision-making regarding the finding of probable cause, 
whether before or after a search is conducted, is a notoriously tricky 
question: 
The nature of probable cause poses a serious cognitive challenge 
for judges in implementing their role as the guardians of the 
Fourth Amendment. The cornerstone of reasonableness in 
searches is the concept of “probable cause.” Commonly, a judge 
                                                                                                             
 23. Nardonne v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939).  
 24. However, some legal scholars worry that in the past three decades the 
Supreme Court has significantly whittled away the Fourth Amendment’s 
protective power by declaring police activities “that could only be described as 
‘searches’ in common parlance as not constituting ‘searches’ at all under the 
Fourth Amendment.” Craig M. Bradley, “Knock and Talk” and the Fourth 
Amendment, 84 IND. L.J. 1099, 1100 (2009). 
 25. John Burkoff, Law Enforcement Use of Drones & Privacy Rights in the 
United States 2 (Univ. of Pittsburg Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 2014-34, 2014). 
 26. See, e.g., Craig Lerner, The Reasonableness of Probable Cause, 81 TEX. 
L.R. 951, 952–56 (2003) (“The reality experienced by American citizens today is 
that they are searched and seized on a regular basis, and for the vast majority of 
these searches (e.g., airport searches, street stops, DUI checkpoints, urine testing 
of government employees), the constitutionality seems to turn not on probable 
cause, but on the reasonableness of the search, factoring in the degree of the 
intrusion and the gravity of the investigated offense.”). 
 27. Probable cause means that a reasonable and cautious officer would believe 
that criminal activity is or was taking place. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). 
 28.  Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983). 
 29. Id. 
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will assess probable cause before the search has been conducted 
because the police normally have to obtain a warrant before 
conducting a search. But with numerous exceptions to the warrant 
requirement that arise from the inevitable exigencies of law 
enforcement, the police conduct a search without obtaining a 
warrant. When faced with such an exigency, the police may avoid 
the need for a warrant, but they must still have probable cause for 
the search. The purpose behind allowing an exigency to exempt the 
police from the warrant requirement is a practical one, but is not 
supposed to allow the police to be subject to a more lenient standard 
of review. When searches conducted without a warrant produce 
incriminating evidence to be used against a criminal defendant, the 
judge must assess probable cause in full knowledge that the search 
uncovered incriminating evidence. Judges must assess the facts just 
as if they did not know that the search uncovered incriminating 
evidence. The standard remains the same, but the perspective from 
which judges review a case inevitably differs in hindsight.30 
There are many circumstances wherein courts are asked to determine 
whether a warrantless search, seizure, or arrest is reasonable after the fact. 
Cases where a search is presumed reasonable include circumstances in 
which a felony arrest is being made in a public place;31 circumstances in 
which the search is incident to a lawful arrest;32 and circumstances in 
which an officer reasonably believes that criminal activity may be afoot in 
a public place.33 The courts have also held that other “exigent” 
circumstances are likely to justify a warrantless search, such as shots fired, 
screams heard, or fire emanating from inside a building.34 
As probable cause itself incorporates an assessment of the likely 
outcome of the search, it seems vulnerable to the influence of the hindsight 
bias, which is the tendency persons have of increased confidence in the 
odds of an outcome once the actual outcome is known.35 This bias 
notoriously influences probability judgments36 and may indicate that 
                                                                                                             
 30. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Probable Cause, Probability, and Hindsight, 
8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 72, 73 (2011). 
 31. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 427 (1976). 
 32. Chimel v. Californa, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). 
 33. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1968). 
 34. Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452 (2011). 
 35. Ulrich Hoffrage, Ralph Hertwig, & Gerd Gigerenzer, Hindsight Bias: A By-
Product of Knowledge Updating?, 26 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH., 556, 566–81 (2000). 
The hindsight bias is also known as the “I knew it all along” effect. Id. at 566. 
 36. Id. 
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judges would be more likely to find a search was justified in cases where 
actual criminal evidence was found than in cases where no evidence was 
found. Despite one study that found at least some judges are able to avoid 
this bias,37 some searches by law enforcement might appear justified by 
probable cause after the fact in part due to the successful outcome of the 
search.  
Worries regarding after-the-fact justifications of a search highlight the 
epistemic challenge facing law enforcement and courts in assessing the 
probabilities regarding probable cause. Determining whether it is more 
likely than not that a crime has occurred, and whether the proposed search 
will generate further evidence of this crime, is a difficult task prior to a 
search. This task is made even more difficult by the realities of in-the-field 
policing, which results in many probable cause judgments made in 
hindsight with knowledge of the outcome of the search.  
The challenge is even more pronounced when the evidence provided 
in support of probable cause is supplied by drone surveillance. A drone 
can be circling for hours, even days, gathering intelligence on a target 
without probable cause. Information gathered via drone may then be used 
to obtain a warrant to search once evidence of a crime has been gathered. 
Then, once a warrant is obtained, the police may enter the specified area 
of the property and search for items listed on the warrant. Police may then 
extend the search beyond the specified area of the property or include other 
items in the search beyond those specified in the warrant if it is necessary 
to ensure their safety or the safety of others, to prevent the destruction of 
evidence, to discover more about possible evidence or stolen items that are 
in plain view, or to hunt for evidence or stolen items that, based upon their 
initial search of the specified area, they believe may be in a different 
location on the property.38 In this way, drone use by law enforcement may 
increase probable cause judgments made in hindsight after incriminating 
evidence has already been found, and thereby increase search powers for 
law enforcement. 
                                                                                                             
 37. Rachlinski, supra note 30. The hindsight bias by judges is a real concern. 
If the judge already knows a particular raid produced incriminating evidence, 
whether a case can be reasonable and fairly assessed is highly questionable. 
Inquiry into what can be known cannot presuppose that it already is known. 
Knowledge can be established only after a certain set of criteria has been met. 
Even then, some epistemologists are still skeptical. See Edmund Gettier, Is 
Justified True Belief Knowledge?, 23 ANALYSIS 121 (1963). 
 38. See generally Phyllis Bookspan, Reworking the Warrant Requirement: 
Resuscitating the Fourth Amendment, 44 VANDERBILT L.J. 473 (1991). 
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B. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy 
Traditionally, constitutional search and seizure jurisprudence has 
relied upon the trespass doctrine, which states that when law enforcement 
effects an unreasonable physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected 
area, a violation of the Fourth Amendment has occurred.39 The trespass 
doctrine’s requirement of a physical intrusion means that trespass law is 
less relevant to drone surveillance because no physical intrusion usually 
occurs when law enforcement uses a drone to provide surveillance 
thousands of feet in the air in legally navigable airspace.40 
The FAA dictates where drones may safely fly, but much surveillance 
can occur from legal airspace. A police officer viewing objects on private 
property that can be seen from a public vantage point is not subject to 
Fourth Amendment protection if it is in “plain view”41—even with 
binoculars.42 The reason this protection is afforded to police is that law 
enforcement’s observation of items in plain view is not deemed a search 
under the Constitution.43 Cases involving law enforcement aircraft use 
have generally held that using airspace to see things in “plain sight” is 
acceptable.44 For example, in Dow Chemical Co. v. U.S., the Supreme 
Court held that the Fourth Amendment did not apply to photographs taken 
from altitudes of 12,000, 3,000, and 1,200 feet.45 As one legal scholar has 
noted, “[a]pplied mechanically, [the public view] doctrine would have 
devastating implications for surveillance by drones, or any other form of 
advanced surveillance technology, operating in public spaces. However . . 
. the Court has acknowledged that, as technology advances, it may need to 
modify its Fourth Amendment analysis.”46 
One way to avoid this sort of mechanical analysis would be to focus 
on the 1967 Supreme Court case of Katz v. U.S., which held that although 
“the Fourth Amendment cannot be translated into a general constitutional 
‘right to privacy,’”47 the Amendment “protects people, not places.”48 Thus, 
what a person “seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to 
                                                                                                             
 39. Brooke Hofhenke, The Fourth Amendment in the Coming Drone Age, 15 
DARTMOUTH L.J. (manuscript at 13) (forthcoming 2017). 
 40. Id. at 15. 
 41. Coolidge v. N.H., 403 U.S. 443 (1971). 
 42. United States v. Lee, 35 F.Supp. 2d 657 (N.D. Ind. 2011). 
 43. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990). 
 44. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986). 
 45. Dow Chemical Co. v. U S., 476 U.S. 227 (1986). 
 46. Hofhenke, supra note 39, at 38. 
 47. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967). 
 48. Id. at 351. 
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the public, may be constitutionally protected.”49 In Katz, Justice Harlan in 
a concurring opinion established a twofold requirement for claims that law 
enforcement has violated the Fourth Amendment by violating a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.50 First, a person must have “exhibited an actual 
(subjective) expectation of privacy,” and second, the expectations must be 
ones “that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”51  
Thus, an unconstitutional search occurs when a subjective expectation 
of privacy determined to be reasonable under the circumstances has been 
violated by state action with no probable cause. Many searches performed 
are warrantless, and in some cases police may search and seize items or 
evidence when there is no physical trespass and no legitimate expectation 
of privacy, and thus no search. Establishing a reasonable subjective 
expectation of privacy would seem to involve exploration of what a person 
knowingly exposes to the public because details of a person’s life that may 
be publicly known are “not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”52  
Complex epistemic issues for a court determining whether a search 
was “reasonable” present themselves. For example, when law enforcement 
does not feel the subject of a search has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy, police will not attempt to secure a warrant. Thus, any challenges 
to a search will be raised after the search has already been performed, often 
as a result of the defense’s attempt to exclude the fruits of the search. For 
courts, establishing a subject’s expectation of privacy after the search has 
occurred, however, is difficult. First, it is often difficult to determine what 
a person “knowingly exposes” to the public. For example, an individual 
may do her pharmacy shopping in public but still have a subjective 
expectation that her birth control habits will remain private. Second, 
establishing expectations of privacy after a search may be subject to the 
hindsight bias. To expand upon the drug store example, once a court 
discovers the individual was buying over-the-counter drugs in order to 
make and sell illegal drugs, it may be less likely that the court will 
determine that the individual had a reasonable expectation of privacy 
regarding her shopping habits at the drug store. 
These difficult issues might be worse in cases where drone 
surveillance is used by law enforcement. As an illustration, suppose a 
drone is deployed to continuously monitor a particular street corner for 
illegal activity. A man is spotted entering an empty storefront every Friday 
at 8:00 p.m. A woman is also seen entering through the back door around 
                                                                                                             
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 362 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 51. Id. at 361. 
 52. Id. at 351 (majority opinion). 
814 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77 
 
 
 
the same time. Law enforcement determines the man’s pattern of activity 
is sufficient to provide probable cause that a crime is occurring. Police use 
this evidence, gleaned without performing a “search”—because the police 
claim there was no reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to the 
man’s actions—to secure a warrant to perform a physical search of the 
property on a Friday at 8:30 p.m. They discover the man with a prostitute 
inside the property and arrest him. 
If the man claims he had a reasonable, subjective expectation of 
privacy with regard to his pattern of movements, even though they were 
public, how a court would evaluate this claim is questionable. No doubt 
the man truly hoped and even expected his meeting the prostitute in an 
empty storefront would remain private, given the precautions he had taken 
to meet the prostitute away from his home or workplace. The question is 
whether this expectation was reasonable. Assuming it is ever reasonable 
for someone to expect criminal activity to remain private, it would seem 
reasonable in this case. 
This example raises several questions. The first is how the court will 
establish a subject’s expectation of privacy when the subject’s behavior is 
already being recorded by law enforcement, particularly after the search is 
already complete and criminal activity has been exposed. This concern 
touches upon worries regarding hindsight bias. The second is the way in 
which the new technology of drone surveillance allows law enforcement 
access to public action in a new way. The use of drones for surveillance 
seems to make worse the court’s challenge of demonstrating an 
expectation of privacy because drones allow for continuous or collective 
monitoring of public action.53 In light of this technology, the court must 
determine whether any behavior citizens knowingly expose to the 
public—behavior such that citizens were traditionally deemed to have no 
reasonable expectation of privacy54—can be interpreted as private 
nonetheless because the behavior is performed by citizens under the 
assumption that their lives are not subject to long-term monitoring and 
analysis by the state. 
                                                                                                             
 53. For example, ordinarily, people have no reasonable expectation of 
privacy with regard to their license plate number. However, “the analysis changes 
if the ALPR [automatic license plate reader] is attached to a drone where such 
technology could, unlike a stationary ALPR, lock on a target’s every move for 
weeks at a time and monitor that individual’s movements with pinpoint accuracy.” 
Sean Sullivan, Domestic Drone Use and the Mosaic Theory 24–25 (Univ. of N.M. 
Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 2013-02, 2013), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2212398 [https://perma.cc/6U5B-M2AE]. 
 54. Id. 
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II. THE COURT’S EPISTEMIC CHALLENGE: COMMON SENSE KNOWLEDGE 
AND ACTIONAL CERTAINTY 
While drone surveillance creates difficult legal hurdles for the Court, 
less obvious are the complicated epistemic challenges underpinning the 
legal difficulties. At issue is whether the Court will cast behavior citizens 
knowingly expose to the public as private. What citizens knowingly expose 
to the public and how citizens’ actions are linked to this knowledge are 
two issues that Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein discusses in his 
posthumously published notes entitled, On Certainty.55 To seek clarity 
from Wittgenstein’s discussion, however, we must first turn to the 
epistemic movement it presupposes, “Common Sense Philosophy.” 
A. Common Sense Philosophy 
“Common sense philosophy” maintains that an ordinary, or “common 
sense,” view of the world is, by and large, correct.56 Its epistemic focus 
highlights the fact that human beings not only know that common sense 
convictions about the world are true, but that human beings know these 
convictions with certainty.57 As such, common sense philosophy is often 
used as a justificatory tool to combat skepticism. One of its leading 
proponents was the British philosopher G.E. Moore.58 In his 1925 article, 
“A Defense of Common Sense,” Moore catalogued a “long list of 
propositions . . . every one of which,” he said, “I know, with certainty, to 
                                                                                                             
 55. See generally LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, ON CERTAINTY (G.E.M. 
Anscombe & G.H. von Wright eds., D. Paul & G.E.M. Anscombe trans. 1972) 
[hereinafter ON CERTAINTY].  
 56. George Edward Moore, A Defense of Common Sense, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
PAPERS 33 (1962).  
 57. Ryan Nichols, Thomas Reid, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reid/#ComSen FirPri [https://perma.cc/8PTN-
72P8] (last updated Sept. 23, 2014). 
 58. Moore, however, was not the first to advocate common sense in an effort 
to combat skepticism. This thread can be traced back to the 18th century and 
Thomas Reid’s “Scottish School of Common Sense.” Against Cartesian 
skepticism, Reid had claimed. 
[t]he evidence of sense, the evidence of memory, and the evidence of the 
necessary relations of things, are all distinct and original kinds of 
evidence, equally grounded on our constitution . . . . To reason against 
any of these kinds of evidence is absurd . . . . They are first principles; 
and such fall not within the province of reason, but of common sense. 
SELECTIONS FROM THE SCOTTISH PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE 48 (G.A. 
Johnston, ed. 1915) (2012). 
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be true.”59 The propositions contained in this list were such “obvious 
truisms” that we hardly find occasion to utter them. They included such 
trivially evident statements as, 
There exists at present a living human body, which is my body . . . 
there are a large number of other living human bodies, each of 
which has . . . at some time been born . . . continued to exist for 
some time after birth . . . been, at every moment of its life after birth, 
either in contact with or not far from the surface of the earth; and 
many of these bodies have already died and ceased to exist.60 
Moore often used “certainty” to place emphasis on what he already 
“knew,” supposing that it might provide even stronger justification against 
the skeptic. For instance, at the end of his article entitled “Proof of an 
External World,” he says his premises—“Here’s one hand, and here’s 
another”—are “among things which I certainly did know.”61 In another 
article entitled “Certainty,” Moore claims to “know with certainty that [he 
has] clothes on.”62 Therefore, certainty seems to indicate a degree of 
knowledge—specifically, knowledge in the highest degree. 
Moore is far from the only philosopher to characterize certainty in this 
manner. René Descartes and David Hume both used it to underscore what 
they knew. Descartes, for instance, said, “I will . . . put aside everything 
that admits of the least of doubt, as if I had discovered it to be completely 
false. I will stay on this course until I know something certain, or, if 
nothing else, until I at least know for certain that nothing is certain.”63 
Likewise, Hume, while discussing necessity and human behavior, stated, 
“I shall say that I know with certainty that he is not to put his hand into the 
fire and hold it there til [sic] it be consumed.”64 For these philosophers and 
throughout the Western philosophical canon, certainty indicates 
knowledge in the highest degree. Despite these assurances of certainty, 
however, the assurances fail to address the problem of skepticism that the 
original knowledge claim creates. If certainty is simply a level within the 
larger body of knowledge, the level of certainty, whether low, moderate, 
                                                                                                             
 59. Moore, supra note 56, at 32.  
 60. Id. at 33. 
 61. George Edward Moore, Proof of an External World, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
PAPERS 127, 149–50 (1962).  
 62. George Edward Moore, Certainty, in PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 227, 227 (1962).  
 63. RENE DESCARTES, MEDITATIONS ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY 17 (Donald A. 
Cress, trans., 3rd ed. 1993) (1641). 
 64. David Hume, Of Liberty and Necessity, in AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING 
HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 50, 58 (Dover Pubs., Inc. 2012) (1748) (emphasis 
added). 
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or even high, matters little. If all knowledge claims were susceptible to 
doubt regardless, an emphasis on the degree of knowledge would not sway 
skeptics. “I know with certainty that p” requires as much justification as 
“I know that p” requires. The degree of certainty provided appears to be 
of little consequence. 
B. Wittgenstein’s On Certainty 
For a set of first-draft notes, On Certainty contains many new and 
important ideas. Wittgenstein sets out to examine topics that were brought 
to his attention after reading Moore, who, in turn, was responding to topics 
that Descartes’s epistemological project had elicited. Wittgenstein clearly 
believed using common sense philosophy to combat skepticism regarding 
true knowledge of the external world was correct.65 He considered 
common sense truisms like Moore’s “The earth exists” or “I have never 
been far from the surface of the earth”66 to be the most propositionally 
basic. He referred to these sorts of statements as “hinge propositions” 
because so much appeared to turn on them.67 When expressed explicitly, 
these propositions represent the most fundamental convictions. Hinge 
propositions are not founded in evidence because nothing more fundamental 
exists on the basis of which they could be believed. This important class of 
propositions has to “stand fast,” like hinges fixed on a frame, so that the 
door—that is, other language games—can turn.68 In four successive 
passages in On Certainty, Wittgenstein describes these propositions: 
                                                                                                             
 65. Students enrolled in his 1939 seminar, the Philosophy of Mathematics, 
report that he even adopted the following slogan: “Don’t treat your commonsense 
like an umbrella. When you come into a room to philosophize, don’t leave it 
outside but bring it in with you.” WITTGENSTEIN’S LECTURES ON THE 
FOUNDATIONS OF MATHEMATICS 68 (Cora Diamond ed. 1976). Numerous 
passages throughout his middle and later periods establish his support for common 
sense. See LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL REMARKS, 61 (Rush Rhees 
ed., Raymond Hargraves & Roger White trans., 1975) (1964); LUDWIG 
WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR 19–20 (Rush Rhees ed., Anthony 
Kenny trans. 1974); see also id. at 257, (“Generality”); id. at 265 (“The 
Inadequacy of the Frege-Russell Notation for Generality”); id. at 451 (“Infinity in 
Mathematics”); id. at 460 (“On Set Theory”). 
 66. Moore, supra note 56, at 32.  
 67. See, e.g., ON CERTAINTY, supra note 55, §§ 341, 343, 355. 
 68. The term “language-game,” says Wittgenstein, “is meant to bring into 
prominence the fact that . . . speaking [a] language is part of an activity, or of [a 
culture,] a form of life.” LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 
§23 (G.E.M. Anscombe trans. 1972) [hereinafter PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS]. 
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§ 341 [T]he questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the 
fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were 
like hinges on which those turn. 
§ 342 That is to say, it belongs to the logic of our scientific 
investigations that certain things are in deed not doubted. 
§ 343 But it isn’t that the situation is like this: We just can’t 
investigate everything, and for that reason we are forced to rest 
content with assumption. If I want the door to turn, the hinges 
must stay put. 
§ 344 My life consists in my being content to accept many things.69  
Although Wittgenstein believed the common sense approach was 
correct, he also recognized its limitations. Although common sense truisms 
are often accepted without much thought, Wittgenstein urges readers to 
consider how strange they sound when uttered, especially when situated 
within a propositional knowledge claim, such as “I know that p.”70 Not only 
do the truisms sound odd, they fail to defeat skepticism, which was 
supposedly the very reason for their existence.71 
Throughout On Certainty, Wittgenstein realizes that although 
statements he had been calling “hinge propositions” contribute to society’s 
“world view,” just as Moore’s common sense propositions do, they do not 
function as propositions, strictly speaking. At sections 204 and 205, 
Wittgenstein takes an important step in his theory, connecting what he had 
been calling “hinge propositions” with action: 
§ 204 Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to 
an end—but the end is not certain propositions’ striking us 
immediately as true, i.e. it is not a kind of seeing on our part; it is 
our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language-game. 
§ 205 If the true is what is grounded, then the ground is not true, 
nor yet false.72 
Thus, although the propositional character of the hinge drops out, 
another non-propositional facet remains. Hinges that stand fast serve to 
frame the background of thoughts and statements.73 These certainties are 
                                                                                                             
 69. ON CERTAINTY, supra note 55, §§ 341–344. 
 70. See id. § 4. 
 71. See generally Peter Klein, Skepticism, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PHILOSOPHY, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/skepticism/ [https://perma.cc/ 
MYZ3-59WP] (last updated June 2, 2015).  
 72. ON CERTAINTY, supra note 55, §§ 204–205. 
 73. See, e.g., id. § 343 (“If I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put.”). 
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grounded in human beings’ actions, not in their statements. As he stated 
elsewhere,  
Why do I not satisfy myself that I have two feet when I want to 
get up from a chair? There is no why. I simply don’t. This is how 
I act. . . . Sure evidence is what we accept as sure, it is evidence 
that we go by in acting surely, acting without any doubt.74 
In Wittgenstein’s developing, exploratory thought, he gradually, 
though perhaps not consciously, moved away from the deceptive 
expression “hinge proposition.”75 Beliefs, or hinges, that stood fast were 
no longer to be thought of as propositional.76 This change marks a 
profound shift in the epistemic landscape: a categorical divide between 
knowledge and certainty and, in particular, a move away from 
propositional certainty toward the non-propositional and non-ratiocinated, 
a certainty manifested in action.77 Wittgensteinian certainties then, are 
manifest without further explanation. They are “actional,” based on 
reflexive actions rather than reflexive speech. 
In sum, in On Certainty, what begins as an analysis of knowledge 
inevitably leads Wittgenstein to consider what, if any, distinction exists 
between “knowledge” and “certainty.” Whether one “knows that p” or one 
“knows with certainty that p,” Wittgenstein recognizes both are 
knowledge claims and, as such, are open to skeptical inquiry.78 The issue 
here turns on the skeptic’s demand for grounds—for example, asking on 
what grounds does the person make such a claim. On this issue, however, 
Wittgenstein notes that grounds for certainty are not the same as grounds 
for knowing because the two concepts are themselves different.79 As he 
says, “[t]he difference between the concept of ‘knowing’ and the concept 
of ‘being certain’ isn’t of any great importance at all, except where ‘I 
know’ is meant to mean ‘I can’t be wrong.’”80 Thus, “knowing” and 
“being certain” must be considered distinct concepts because they differ 
                                                                                                             
 74. Id. § 196.  
 75. ON CERTAINTY, supra note 55, § 141. 
 76. Id. § 141. 
 77. Id. § 204. 
 78. This recognition occurs in several places in On Certainty. See, e.g., ON 
CERTAINTY, supra note 55, §§ 1, 6–8, 11, 12, 14, 18, 42, 56, 58, 84, 86, 112–122, 
160, 174, 178, 181–189, 194, 340, 357, 395, 481, 482.  
 79. Id. § 8.  
 80. Id. For circumstances when it is “of no great importance at all,” then, as 
Wittgenstein says, “[i]n a law-court, for example, ‘I am certain” could replace ‘I 
know’ in every piece of testimony.” Id. 
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not in degree, as it had typically been described, but rather in kind. For 
Wittgenstein, knowledge and certainty “belong to different categories.”81 
By placing knowledge and certainty in different categories, 
Wittgenstein began laying the groundwork for a new approach to skeptical 
problems. Although knowledge claims require justificatory responses 
when challenged—responses that are propositional in character—certainty 
claims do not. Certainty, he argues, is altogether different from 
knowledge.82 Hinge or common sense propositions may represent the most 
certain, most fundamental convictions, but society believes them, and not 
because it can justify them—these core-beliefs “lie beyond being justified 
or unjustified.”83 Unlike Moore and other philosophers before him, 
Wittgenstein does not stop here. A fundamental belief—for example, “The 
earth exists”—is not justified when a person states it, reiterates it, or even 
supplies further explanation for it. Rather, certainty that the earth exists is 
exhibited, unreflectively, “in the way [we] act.”84 Civilization walks upon 
the earth, wages war on it, plants trees on it, and buries its dead in it. The 
convictions that stand fast for civilization frame the background of its 
thoughts and statements. These certainties are grounded in unreflective 
actions, not in unreflective utterances. Thus, Wittgenstein, instead of 
saying, “This is why . . .” or “because . . .” at this point states, “I am 
inclined to say: ‘This is simply what I do.’”85 Of significance is that this 
action—“what I do”—does not occur at any ratiocinative level. Although 
it may be a thought that is considered and stated in hindsight, certainty is 
not actively considered. 
This proposition marks a profound shift in thought. Knowledge about 
the world requires evidence and justification, but evidence for one’s 
fundamental non-reflective convictions—evidence for certainty—is as 
deep as one can possibly dig. “If I have exhausted the justifications I have 
reached bedrock and my spade is turned.”86 Bedrock is an apt metaphor, 
as some scholars have described his method in On Certainty as a “new 
kind of foundationalism.”87 “New” because unlike the traditional 
                                                                                                             
 81. Id. § 308.  
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. § 359.  
 84. Id. § 395 (emphasis added).  
 85. PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 68, § 217 (emphasis added). 
 86. Id.  
 87. See AVRUM STROLL ET AL., MOORE AND WITTGENSTEIN ON CERTAINTY 
6 (1994); Daniéle Moyal-Sharrock, Logic in Action: Wittgenstein’s Logical 
Pragmatism and the Impotence of Skepticism, 26 PHIL. INVESTIGATIONS 125, 
127–28 (2003); ROBERT BRICE, EXPLORING CERTAINTY: WITTGENSTEIN AND 
WIDE FIELDS OF THOUGHT, at xi (2014). 
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propositional foundationalism found in Descartes, Moore, and others, 
Wittgenstein’s foundationalism differs in kind. It is a non-propositional 
certainty, grounded in unreflective actions. 
C. Objections 
Not all scholars agree with this assessment of Wittgenstein. Some, 
such as A.C. Grayling and Martin Kush, believe among the other items 
uncovered in On Certainty, a form of relativism is present.88 Grayling, in 
particular, describes it as “classically strong relativism.”89 Two problems 
exist, however, with Grayling’s evaluation of On Certainty: first, he does 
not accurately define relativism; and second, nowhere in his article does 
he discuss Wittgenstein’s move from propositional certainty to non-
propositional, non-ratiocinated action. 
Grayling defines relativism in a highly subjective way:  
[T]ruth and knowledge are not absolute or invariable, but 
dependent upon viewpoint, circumstances or historical conditions. 
What is true for me might not be true for you; what counts as 
knowledge from one viewpoint might not from another; what is 
true at one time is false at another.90  
This account of relativism is problematic. Although knowledge may not 
be “absolute,” that does not mean it is merely subjective or “dependent 
                                                                                                             
 88. See Martin Kusch, Wittgenstein’s On Certainty and Relativism, in 
ANALYTIC AND CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY: METHODS AND PERSPECTIVES 29 
(Harald A. Wiltsche & Sonja Rinofer-Kreidl, eds., 2016), http://www.academia 
.edu/11693512/Wittgensteins_On_Certainty_and_Relativism [https://perma.cc 
/5ANM-2ZQ5]. Kusch says it is “a mistake to count the book as a whole as either 
relativistic or anti-relativistic.” Id. at 37. He sees some passages that advocate for 
relativism and others that do not. Id. These statements are true for Grayling as 
well.  
 89. Grayling actually believes two conflicting themes are present in On 
Certainty: first, a reply to skepticism “of a broadly foundationalist stamp” and 
second, “classically strong relativism.” A.C. GRAYLING, Wittgenstein on Skepticism 
and Certainty, in WITTGENSTEIN: A CRITICAL READER 305, 305, 308 (H.J. Glock 
ed., 2001). Although Grayling asserts these two themes are in conflict, the relativism 
he finds in On Certainty poses a threat to Wittgenstein’s reply to foundationalism. 
Grayling finds this tension so great that he divides his exegesis of On Certainty in 
two. Id. at 306–07. He refers to the first theme, the reply to skepticism bearing the 
stamp of foundationalism, as OC1, and the second theme, relativism, as OC2. Id. 
 90. Id. at 308. 
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upon viewpoint.”91 Knowledge can be both objective and relative.92 
Consider, for instance, a drug that has proven through well-designed, 
randomized clinical trials to be a highly successful treatment for a 
particular disease. This knowledge is a matter of objective knowledge. 
Still, it is relative to existing knowledge and research because in 15 to 20 
years, well-designed, randomized clinical trials may show that some 
newer treatment is still more effective than the drug currently available. 
Grayling’s definition of relativism stems from a commonly mistaken 
understanding of antonyms. The antonym of “relative” is “absolute,” not 
“objective.”93 John Rawls, the American moral and political philosopher, 
once defined this sort of objective knowledge in terms of “provisional . . . 
fixed points,” potentially subject to revision.94 Knowledge’s fallibility, and 
in some sense relativity, does not mean that knowledge cannot be 
objective, nor does it mean that society cannot be objectively certain of 
many different things.95 The new kind of foundationalism present here 
occurs when Wittgenstein ties what he calls “hinge propositions” with 
acting. Grayling overlooks this shift. When formulated explicitly in 
ordinary language, hinge propositions constitute the most fundamental 
convictions. Evidence does not support them, according to Wittgenstein—
nothing more fundamental exists on the basis of which they could be 
believed.96 Like hinges fixed on a frame, this special class of propositions 
must “stand fast” for the door to turn. 
D. Wittgenstein’s Actional Certainty and Expectations of Privacy 
The epistemic distinction between knowledge and certainty is relevant 
to the question regarding expectations of privacy over behavior a person 
knowingly exposes to the public. In keeping with the above interpretation 
of Wittgenstein, people possess a non-ratiocinated, actional certainty that 
they are living their lives in private. Citizens know that their daily public 
movements are exposed to public view in small ways, but they still act 
with the certainty that their patterns of movement—which Justice 
Sotomayor and others have noticed express identity and character97—will 
                                                                                                             
 91. Id. 
 92. NELSON GOODMAN, FACT, FICTION, AND FORECAST 65–68 (1955). 
 93. Letter from Dr. Martin Benjamin, Professor Emeritus, Dep’t of Philosophy, 
Mich. State Univ., to Robert Brice (on file with author). 
 94. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 19 (1971). 
 95.  See GOODMAN, supra note 92.  
 96. ON CERTAINTY, supra note 55, § 341.  
 97. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, 
J., concurring) (“Awareness that the Government may be watching chills 
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be private, that is, not scrutinized or evaluated by the government. As such, 
a particular public task or snapshot of a behavior or action may be exposed 
to the public and thus be in “plain view.”98 Taken together, however, a 
compilation of these snapshots reveals a large part of citizens’ lives and 
identities. Admittedly, these lives are lived within the public community. 
Even so, citizens assume that their life plans, dreams, affiliations, goals, 
characters, and identities are private unless they engage in a course of 
specific, mindful action to place them on display.  
For instance, citizens assume local police officials do not know their 
sexual orientation or religious and political affiliations, unless they have 
yard signs or bumper stickers or take other mindful action to expose 
themselves, such as  attending law enforcement meetings and discussing 
one’s affiliations. Citizens would be surprised if local law enforcement 
knew details of their lives. They are certain that these aspects of their lives 
are private, and they are certain that they will remain private unless or until 
they make them public with some positive, mindful action. Their certainty 
is presupposed in their unreflective action of living their lives within their 
communities. Hence, non-reflective actions exhibit a reasonable 
expectation of privacy regarding character and identities, even if particular 
actions, within a particular short timeframe, are not private. 
The certainty that details of citizens’ lives and identities will remain 
private seems reasonable given the assumed epistemic limitations of those 
who live nearby. Citizens would not expect other citizens or governmental 
actors to learn details of their character and identity without their 
knowledge based upon everyday public interactions or observations of 
particular behavior. Only those with whom citizens have repeated close 
contact are likely to learn about their private lives, and by having repeated 
contact, citizens mindfully choose to expose certain aspects of themselves. 
For example, a co-worker will know another’s professional skills; a dry 
cleaner will know clothing preferences; and a grocer may learn eating 
preferences. Citizens choose to interact regularly with these people, 
knowing that they are exposing certain aspects of their lives to them. 
Citizens would not expect their dry cleaners, however, to know their eating 
preferences. Citizens would also not expect governmental actors, whom 
they have not chosen to interact with, to know their character and identity. 
                                                                                                             
associational and expressive freedoms. And the Government’s unrestrained 
power to assemble data that reveal private aspects of identity is susceptible to 
abuse.”); People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199–200 (2009) (“What the 
technology yields and records with breathtaking quality and quantity is a highly 
detailed profile, not simply of where we go, but by easy inference, of our 
associations—political, religious, amicable and amorous, to name only a few—
and of the pattern of our professional and avocational pursuits.”).  
 98. Coolidge v. N.H., 403 U.S. 443 (1971). 
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To see how closely tied actional certainty is to a person’s expectation 
of privacy, assume for a moment that a person’s life plans, goals, and other 
personal aspects are not private. This public nature would have an effect 
on a person’s actions. If citizens no longer had an expectation of privacy 
with regard to affiliations, preferences, and identity when acting in 
public—that is, if citizens thought their actions might be monitored, 
surveilled, recorded, and analyzed—citizens would not likely perform 
their daily actions in the same manner they would perform them had they 
possessed this expectation. Perhaps citizens would with a few of their 
actions, but certainly not all of them. Actions would very likely be altered, 
in some cases even dramatically.99 Persons act with an unreflective 
certainty that they are living their lives in private. This expectation is not 
only a reasonable one to infer, but a necessary one—and it is necessarily 
tied to unreflective actions. 
III. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: A WITTGENSTEINIAN APPROACH  
Following the argument discussed in Part II.D, citizens possess a non-
ratiocinated, actional certainty that they are living the whole of lives in 
private, free from government observance. While a particular public action 
may be exposed to the public, and thus may be considered in “plain view,” 
a compilation of these snapshots reveals a large part of citizens’ lives and 
identities about which citizens have expectations of privacy. This actional 
certainty helps inform the analysis regarding citizens’ privacy and the use 
of drones.  
A. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy and Actional Certainty 
In general, law enforcement has a duty to obtain a warrant before 
installing a surveillance device on a private citizen’s property.100 In U.S. 
v. Jones, five of the Justices held that by attaching a GPS to the defendant’s 
vehicle, the government physically intruded upon private property.101 The 
Court dismissed the government’s argument that Jones had no reasonable 
                                                                                                             
 99. This example is not simply a hypothetical; a body of evidence supports this 
proposition. See Arthur Beaman et al., Self-Awareness and Transgression in 
Children: Two Field Studies, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1835, 1835–46 
(1979). See generally Daniel Nettle et al., ‘Cycle Thieves, We Are Watching You’: 
Impact of a Simple Signage Intervention against Bicycle Theft, PLOS ONE, Dec. 
2012, at 1, DOI:10.1371/pone.0051738, http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article 
?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0051738 [https://perma.cc/9QBL-2Q9C]. 
 100. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984). 
 101. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949. 
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expectation of privacy on a public street and stated that it must protect 
privacy at least to the degree in which it existed at the time of the adoption 
of the Fourth Amendment.102 Justice Sotomayor joined the majority, but 
also wrote separately to express that under a Katz analysis, long-term 
electronic surveillance would violate a reasonable expectation of privacy.103 
Sotomayor argued that the majority opinion, which focused on the 
government’s placing of the GPS system on the defendant’s car as a physical 
trespass, provided little guidance in cases in which the government can 
monitor movements without a physical invasion.104 Justice Sotomayor 
argued that short-term remote surveillance may also qualify as a 
constitutional violation in some circumstances.105 New technologies are 
capable of painting a detailed picture of one’s personal life and are not 
subjected to the same limitations as traditional forms of surveillance.106 
Additionally, these newer technologies are cheap to purchase and 
implement.107 Sotomayor quoted the New York appellate court opinion in 
People v. Weaver108 at length: 
Disclosed in [GPS] data . . . will be trips the indisputably private 
nature of which takes little imagination to conjure: trips to the 
psychiatrist, the plastic surgeon, the abortion clinic, the AIDS 
treatment center, the strip club, the criminal defense attorney, the 
by-the-hour motel, the union meeting, the mosque, synagogue or 
church, the gay bar, and on and on.109 
Sotomayor noted that “[a]wareness that the Government may be 
watching chills associational and expressive freedoms. And the 
Government’s unrestrained power to assemble data that reveal private 
aspects of identity is susceptible to abuse.”110 Sotomayor made clear that 
citizens may not reasonably expect their movements to be recorded and 
aggregated such that details of their associations and identity would be 
revealed.111 More specifically, she indicated that it might be time to 
reconsider the notion that an individual has no reasonable expectation of 
                                                                                                             
 102. Hofhenke, supra note 39, at 8–9. 
 103. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).  
 104. Id.  
 105. Id.  
 106. Id.  
 107. Id.  
 108. 909 N.E.2d 1195 (2009). 
 109. Jones, 123 S. Ct. at 955 (citing Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1199). 
 110. Id. at 956.  
 111. Id.  
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privacy in information that is voluntarily disclosed to a third party.112 In 
the digital age, possession of a cell phone often means that the details of 
every movement are disclosed to a third party.113 It might be time, 
Sotomayor says, to stop treating “secrecy as a prerequisite for privacy.”114 
Sotomayor’s view fits nicely under the Wittgensteinian approach. 
Citizens’ lives are lived in public spaces within a publicly observable 
community. Citizens, however, mindfully expose certain moments of their 
lives to the public, and certain aspects of their lives to certain persons 
based upon a chosen relationship with them. Nonetheless, citizens act with 
the certainty that their patterns of behavior are, in fact, private—not 
dissected or assessed by the government. Indeed, that certainty is 
presupposed in their unreflective action, which exhibits a reasonable 
expectation of privacy. 
Of interest is that in another Jones concurring opinion, Justice Alito 
indicated that the level of crime might determine the reasonableness of 
advanced technology monitoring.115 Alito claimed that the placement of 
the GPS on the defendant’s car did not itself constitute a search under the 
Fourth Amendment.116 Alito argued that the Court ought not to have 
focused on “technical trespass” and instead should have used a Katz 
expectation of privacy test, even though “judges are apt to confuse their 
own expectations of privacy with those of the hypothetical reasonable 
person to which the Katz test looks.”117 Alito also indicated that what 
society expects to be reasonable may shift as technology advances118: 
“[u]nder this approach, relatively short-term monitoring of a person’s 
movements on public streets accords with expectations of privacy that our 
society has recognized as reasonable.”119 Longer-term GPS monitoring, 
however, in investigations of most offenses—presumably, lesser 
offenses—impinges upon expectations of privacy.120 
Justice Alito’s allusion that the type of crime being investigated might 
impact the reasonableness of privacy expectations is alarming. As one 
legal scholar noted, “Justice Alito’s ‘level of crime’ argument is off-
putting mainly because this is not how the Fourth Amendment normally 
operates; individuals either have a reasonable expectation of privacy, 
                                                                                                             
 112. Id. at 957. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id.  
 115. Id. at 958 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 962 (majority opinion). 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 960. 
 120. Id. at 964. 
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based on the circumstances, or they do not.”121 This Article concurs: 
persons have actional certainty of privacy regardless of the criminal harm 
they may cause. In sum, Justice Alito’s claim would not fit well under the 
Wittgensteinian approach because persons have an expectation of privacy 
that is borne out in their unreflective actions. “Reasonableness” here is 
neither variable, nor is it provisionally fixed based upon assessments such 
as severity of crime. Reasonableness is located in what Wittgenstein calls 
the bedrock, and it is reflected in the certainty of non-propositional, non-
ratiocinated actions.122 
B. The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment 
Justice Sotomayor invoked what is called the “mosaic theory”123 in her 
Jones concurrence, and this theory is also reflected in Chief Justice 
Roberts’s analysis in Riley v. California.124 Under the mosaic theory of the 
Fourth Amendment, searches can be analyzed as a collective sequence of 
steps rather than as individual steps.125 This theory may serve to explain 
the reasonableness of expectations of privacy with regard to continuous 
monitoring and the aggregation of data relating to an individual’s life, as 
drones are designed to do. “Drone surveillance that tracks an individual’s 
movements for hours, days, or weeks may qualify as an unreasonable 
search absent a warrant. . . . The biggest challenge with the mosaic theory 
is its lack of clarity as to what the threshold amount of surveillance is 
before the Fourth Amendment kicks in.”126 In Jones, both concurrences 
agreed that 28 days was too long, but declined to set out a specific timeline 
or cut-off point.127  
The mosaic approach recognizes the actional certainty with which 
citizens live their lives. This approach rejects applying the plain-view 
                                                                                                             
 121. Hofhenke, supra note 39, at 17. 
 122. ON CERTAINTY, supra note 55, § 217.  
 123. The “mosaic theory” label was first used by legal scholar Orin Kerr in a blog 
post. See Orin Kerr, D.C. Circuit Introduces “Mosaic Theory” of Fourth Amendment, 
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 124. 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014). In Riley, the Court ruled that law enforcement 
generally may not, without a warrant, search digital information on a cell phone 
seized from an individual who has been arrested. See id. at 2485. 
 125. See generally Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 
111 MICH. L. REV. 311 (2012). 
 126. Hofhenke, supra note 39, at 18. 
 127. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).  
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doctrine, which might be reasonably applied when a police officer sees 
clear, decisive steps taken toward commission of a criminal offense— 
actions that would ground probable cause—but that should not be used to 
justify long-term surveillance without a warrant. The mosaic approach 
may be used to support the conclusion that law enforcement must use a 
warrant every time they deploy a drone. Under the assumption that drone 
surveillance by law enforcement violates a citizen’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy, probable cause should have to be demonstrated in 
every case in which a drone was used.128 
Legal scholar Orin Kerr, however, has argued that courts abandoning 
a sequential approach to the Fourth Amendment in favor of a mosaic 
approach is a mistake.129 Before recent cases that seem to apply the mosaic 
theory, courts looked at sequences of snapshots of governmental action 
and assessed it in isolation.130 Because the mosaic theory rejects the 
“building block of the sequential approach,” Kerr argued, the theory would 
be difficult to administer.131 Kerr worried about what specific standard 
would be developed by the courts under a mosaic analysis; how law 
enforcement conduct would be grouped into a cohesive whole; and how 
courts would determine if a mosaic search was reasonable.132 
Kerr claims three different approaches to determining society’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy have emerged from the mosaic cases.133 
Justice Alito’s standard focused on societal expectations about law 
enforcement practices.134 Justice Sotomayor, on the other hand, argued 
that a search occurs when the government can learn details about a 
person’s personal life “at will.”135 Justice Ginsberg focused on whether the 
government learned more than a stranger could have observed.136 Justice 
Sotomayor’s argument goes further than Kerr’s interpretation, however. 
In People v. Weaver, Justice Sotomayor indicated that a society’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy—even under the most charitable 
interpretations of “reasonable”—has been violated given the wealth of 
information that can be extracted from a GPS device.137 This Article 
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proposes that the Court continue to use the reasonable expectation of 
privacy standard in cases in which the mosaic theory is applied; the 
standard would simply be applied to continuous monitoring instead of 
specific instances of monitoring. 
Kerr worried which sort of government action would constitute a 
search under the mosaic theory.138 Designation of law enforcement action 
as a search based upon physical trespass is certainly easier. The Court 
already indicated its willingness, however, to turn away from trespass-
based searches when necessary and focus on reasonable expectations of 
privacy in Katz.139 The Katz test should be used in cases involving drone 
surveillance by law enforcement. Given the current state of technology 
and law enforcement practices, the question is whether citizens would 
reasonably expect to be subject to continuous surveillance of their 
movements, when this surveillance is evaluated by computer software 
looking for patterns of behavior that might indicate criminal activity. The 
expectation should not depend simply on what individual behaviors a 
person attempted to keep private, as Sotomayor suggested, but also on 
whether citizens reasonably expect their patterns of behavior, possibly 
even discerned by a computer program, to be private. 
Assessing society’s reasonable expectation of privacy might best be 
accomplished when observed within a point of contrast between that 
which persons knowingly expose to the public—to which they have no 
reasonable expectation of privacy—and the non-ratiocinated, actional 
certainty that persons have that they are living their lives in private—out 
of sight from government eyes.140 Citizens know that while their particular 
public movements are observable and in “plain view,” they nonetheless 
act with the unreflective certainty that the government is not compiling 
and assessing these particular movements to observe certain “patterns of 
behavior.”141 A compilation of these snapshots reveals a large and detailed 
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part of citizens’ lives: their characters, identities, and affiliations. Through 
their unreflective actions, citizens clearly exhibit a reasonable expectation 
that these aspects of their lives will remain private. 
Finally, Kerr worried about how long and how in-depth surveillance 
must be to constitute a search.142 These factors, however, must be 
determined by the courts as cases arise. Of the nine Supreme Court 
Justices, five indicated in Jones that 28 days of GPS surveillance, even in 
absence of a physical trespass, constituted a search.143 This holding alone, 
however, might be insufficient to indicate to law enforcement that they 
cannot deploy drones for continuous monitoring of patterns of behavior. 
If law enforcement is interested primarily in a specific citizen’s patterns 
of behavior, they ought to have probable cause already to perform drone 
surveillance on that citizen. 
CONCLUSION 
Even what a person exposes to the public may warrant an expectation 
of privacy, especially when taken as a collective whole. This expectation 
is demonstrated in the certainty of his unreflective actions.144 That is to 
say, it is reasonable to assume that people have an expectation of privacy 
with regard to the details of their lives and identities because this 
expectation is borne out in their unreflective actions. “Reasonableness” is 
located in what Wittgenstein calls the “bedrock,” and it is one among many 
of society’s core, unreflective convictions that contribute to society’s 
epistemic foundation.145 Seeing this principle in action is not difficult. 
Assume that because of government surveillance, anything that could be 
deduced from public actions, including life plans, goals, and other details, 
were not private. Consider what effect this lack of privacy would have on 
citizens’ actions—especially those who felt their preferences or identities 
were not the preferences and identities favored by the government, or 
those who were worried the government might be biased against them in 
the future. If citizens no longer had an expectation of privacy, they may 
not perform their daily actions in the same way they would perform them 
had they possessed this expectation. They act with the unreflective 
certainty that they are living their lives in private. Such an expectation is 
reasonable and, by virtue of our unreflective actions, necessary. 
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Although the use of drones will undoubtedly provide law enforcement 
agencies with a new means of gathering intelligence, these unmanned 
aircrafts bring with them a host of legal and epistemic challenges. The 
principal issue turns on what reasonably constitutes a search. Because 
drones can remain airborne for extended periods, drone surveillance by 
law enforcement would violate a reasonable expectation of privacy. In 
Katz, the Supreme Court held that what a person “seeks to preserve as 
private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally 
protected.”146 Citizens have a reasonable expectation of privacy with 
regard to information that could be deduced from long-term surveillance 
of citizen actions. Therefore, a warrant should be required in every case in 
which law enforcement uses a drone for surveillance of citizen actions. 
                                                                                                             
 146. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
